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This paper uses a unique set of new indicators enabling us to test the effects of cultural and 
institutional barriers on migration between OECD countries. Using data on migration flows 
between 22 OECD countries over the period 1990-2003, we find strong evidence for the 
negative effect of cultural differences on international migration flows. Cultural barriers do a 
much better job in explaining the pattern of migration flows between developed countries than 
traditional economic variables such as income and unemployment differentials.  
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1 Introduction 
One of the basic principles of the European Union is the freedom of movement of factors of 
production and, in particular, of workers. In practice, there is little movement, both between and 
within countries, despite the presence of large economic differentials4. Numerous empirical 
studies establish the low migratory responses to unemployment and wage differentials (see for 
example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Gros 1996). Obviously there are gains from migration 
and the challenge is to explain why people fail to exploit them. The focus of the literature has 
therefore shifted towards finding explanations for the “European immobility puzzle”5.   
Low migratory responses to unemployment and wage differentials can explain why 
European mobility is low, but they fail to explain why migration flows between some countries 
are almost non-existent, while between other countries there are substantial flows in both 
directions (see Table A.2 in the appendix). For example, there are large migration flows 
between Belgium and France, in both directions; and there is very little migration between 
Greece and Finland in any direction. Obviously, economic differentials between countries will 
not help much in explaining this pattern. Cultural proximity, on the other hand, is a strong 
candidate as it is pair-specific and varies across pairs of countries.  
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate the role of cultural barriers by using a 
wide range of refined indicators of these cultural barriers to migration. Until now, appropriate 
measures lacked, which explains why the empirical literature has drawn little attention to the 
role of these costs. The research into the determinants of migration hardly ever goes beyond the 
inclusion of a simple dummy for sharing a common language. This paper provides unique 
empirical evidence showing that cultural barriers play a crucial role in migration, far beyond the 
effect of speaking a different language, and do a better job in explaining migration patterns 
between developed countries than differentials in economic variables.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on a panel of 22 OECD countries over the period 1990-2003. 
We do not include any developing countries, as our interest is primarily in the determinants of 
migration between developed countries. We suspect that the mechanisms driving migration 
between developed countries may be different than those driving migration between developing 
and developed countries. Economic differentials are expected to be much smaller between 
OECD countries for example, although they do remain substantial. For example, the GDP per 
capita in Luxembourg is three times as large as in Greece. The inclusion of both economic and 
cultural variables allows us to compare the relative effects of both factors on migration. The fact 
that our sample includes countries outside the European Economic Area also enables us to 
evaluate the effect of the law allowing free mobility of people across borders.  
To estimate the migration model we use a population averaged negative binomial model. 
This is a methodological contribution to the empirical literature. With this estimation technique 
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we are able to cope with several econometric problems that the empirical migration literature is 
frequently plagued with. These problems arise because migration flows are not distributed in 
the standard way. Migration flows are always discrete and non-negative, and small numbers are 
overrepresented. This is often dealt with by log-linearizing the equation. However, this 
technique may not be appropriate in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Our estimation 
technique therefore seems preferable to what has been used before in the literature.  
The empirical analysis presented in this paper yields important insights in the effects of 
economic and cultural variables on migration between OECD countries. It shows that especially 
the cultural and linguistic links between countries are very important in explaining migration 
flows. The impact of a 1% increase in linguistic distance on migration flows between two 
countries is for example much stronger than the effect of a 1% increase in unemployment. 
Before discussing the econometric results, we will give an overview of the related literature 
in the next Section. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model of migration that justifies the 
empirical strategy. The construction of the different cultural distance measures is discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the estimation of the migration equation. It discusses the data 
set and other variables included in the analysis, the econometric specification and the results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Related literature 
There is an extensive literature on the theoretical determinants of international migration (see 
Ghatak and Levine (1996), Borjas (1999a) and Hatton and Williamson (2002) for surveys). The 
determinants that explain international migration can be classified into a few broad categories: 
economic incentives, demographic explanations, distance and network effects. We briefly 
describe these categories and discuss the empirical literature. 
 
The importance of economic incentives is stressed by the classical model of Harris and Todaro 
(1970). It assumes that individuals base their migration decision on the differential between the 
expected income at destination and the expected income at home. The model predicts that 
economic differentials should lead to compensating migration flows. Economic differentials 
should then decrease over time.  
 Given the large persistent economic differentials observed across OECD countries, this 
basic model does not seem to fit with the picture of the developed world, since we observe 
persistent and large economic differentials between countries, and little migration between 
them. The existence of economic differentials suggests that there are economic incentives to 
migrate between countries, but people do not seem to exploit them.  Note that differentials in 
expected income are not the only relevant economic incentives we should take into account, 
especially when focusing on the developed world. Countries differ in their social security and 
tax systems. These differences could also influence migration decisions.  
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 It could be that levels of income matter more than differentials (Braunerhjelm et al. 
2000).Developed countries provide a socially acceptable income to almost everyone. The 
generosity of the welfare system could decrease the incentives to migrate, precisely for those 
who should migrate (see Chorny et al., 2007, for a comprehensive discussion). For example, 
Antolin and Bover (1997) find for Spain that registered unemployed (entitled to benefits) are 
less likely to move than non-registered unemployed (not entitled to benefits). Welfare recipients 
have also fewer incentives to migrate, as they would probably lose their rights to welfare 
benefits. Similarly, some argue that families may offer income substitutes in case of negative 
shocks and reduce the need to migrate.  
 
Next, we find a series of explanations based on the composition of the population, and on the 
idea that some segments of the population are more inclined to migrate than others 
(demographic explanations).  The first is Age structure of the population: Young cohorts are 
more mobile than old cohorts (see Fertig and Schmidt 2002). All else equal, the ageing of the 
population in the developed world would lead to a fall in the average migration rate. There 
could be several reasons why older workers are less likely to migrate (Tassinopoulos and 
Werner 1999): Older workers have acquired more specific human capital, which could be lost 
in case of migration; they have fewer years to recoup their migration investment; or they may 
face higher migration costs (stronger social ties, higher costs to learn a foreign language, etc.).  
 The second demographic explanation has to do with the Education structure of the 
population: Higher skilled workers are more likely to migrate than low-skilled workers (e.g. 
Wildasin 2000 for the United States, Mauro and Spilimbergo 1999 for Spain and Gianetti 2001 
for Italy). There is also a large evidence based on micro data. Education increases significantly 
the probability of moving. The reason why this is the case could either be that high-skilled 
workers face lower migration costs or that they gain more from migrating. High-skilled workers 
are more likely to speak another language or have better qualities of adaptation, which makes it 
less costly for them to migrate. Similarly, if migration costs are to some extent fixed, the 
relative burden of migration costs will be higher for low-skilled than high-skilled workers. The 
former may be credit-constrained and not be able to pay the migration costs (see Pedersen et al. 
2008). High-skilled workers may also gain more by migrating, if for example wage differentials 
are larger for high-skilled workers than low-skilled ones.  
 Finally, a third demographic factor that may play a role is female participation. 
Coordinating migration decisions of two-earners households may be more difficult than of one-
earner households. We could therefore expect that countries with high participation rates of 
women have a lower propensity to migrate.6  
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Another determinant of migration often mentioned in the literature is the distance between 
countries, defined in a broad way. First, the physical distance between the place of origin and 
the place of destination could discourage migration for two reasons: It is a psychic cost (and 
direct migration cost) and it reduces the quality of information about the destination. The 
further away the country, the less likely people will be informed about job opportunities, 
income differentials, etc. The argument was already mentioned by Sjaastad (1962). We could 
use the same argument for migration costs: the further away the country of destination, the 
worse the information people have about costs they will need to incur when migrating.  
 The importance of cultural links is also at the centre of the recent literature on 
networks. The main idea is that the presence of a national community in the country of 
destination could increase its attractiveness (Carrington et al. 1996). All over the world, we find 
“Little Italy’s”, “Chinatowns”, etc. showing that ethnic groups tend to cluster in some 
geographical areas. There are many ways these communities could ease the immigration of their 
national counterparts. For example, they could provide information about the local customs and 
values, job opportunities, etc. They could also provide a substitute to the social network in the 
country of origin. It may indeed be easier to migrate to a geographical area with a high 
concentration of people sharing the same language and culture than one’s own. A number of 
empirical studies find supporting evidence for the existence of network effects (Munshi (2003), 
Mayda (2008), Pedersen et al. (2008), Hatton and Williamson (2005), Clark et al. (2004), 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007)).  All these studies include both developing and developed 
countries. It is not certain, however, that networks play an important role in international 
migration between developed countries. Gross and Schmitt (2002) find that cultural 
communities are more attractive for immigrants from non-OECD source countries than from 
OECD source countries.  
 Most empirical studies find a strong correlation between the size of the national 
community in the country of destination and the importance of migration flows. One should be 
careful, however, in the interpretation of this coefficient. Palloni et al. (2001) discuss the fact 
that the existence of networks is not the only theory that could explain the positive correlation. 
Other theories lead to exactly the same predictions. First, there is the “common characteristics 
and constraints” theory, saying that individuals living in the same region are likely to share 
common characteristics and constraints influencing the migration decision. Controlling for a 
wide set of characteristics of the country of origin and destination can help reducing the 
influence of this effect in the observed correlation. Second, migration decisions often involve 
households and families, instead of individuals. Migration decisions of the same family will be 
correlated, even in the absence of network effects. We should keep this in mind when turning to 
the empirical analysis.  
 
The lack of data on aggregate migration flows between countries compromised for a long time 
the empirical testing of migration theories. The only aggregate data available were on net 
immigration rates, i.e. simply the difference between the growth rate of the population and the 
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natural growth rate. The problem is that the net immigration rate confuses information about 
inflows and outflows, and is a unilateral measure. Since migration inflows and outflows rarely 
involve two countries only, this type of measure makes it impossible to test the Harris-Todaro 
theory that assumes that migration decisions are based on economic differentials between pairs 
of countries. Gross inflows and outflows between two countries provide much better 
information than net immigration rates. It is hard, however, to obtain consistent data on gross 
inflows and outflows between pair of countries. Countries do not agree on the definition of a 
migrant, they differ in the way they measure inflows, etc. For these reasons, migration data has 
been incomplete and unsatisfactory for many years.  
 Van Wissen and Visser (1998) is one of the rare studies on migration flows between a 
large number of developed countries. They use data on gross migration flows between the 
fifteen European countries of the EU (before May 2004) for the year 1994. They find strong 
effects of the variables measuring the stocks of foreigners in the country of origin and of 
destination. On the other hand, differentials in GDP do not have a significant effect, neither do 
physical distance and language proximity (the author introduces dummies for four language 
groups and classify the countries accordingly).  
 Two recent papers (Mayda (2008) and Pedersen et al. (2008)) analyze the determinants 
of gross migration flows into OECD countries, testing for a series of migration theories. Mayda 
(2008) uses OECD data on 14 OECD countries, over the period 1980-1996. She finds that the 
earnings differentials stimulate migration, and that this effect is dominated by the pulling effect 
of the GDP per worker at destination. The GDP per worker at origin does not have a strong 
effect, which could be justified by the combination of fixed migration costs and binding poverty 
constraints. Physical distance matters as well, but sharing a common language does not. Finally, 
sharing a common colonial past has a surprising negative effect on emigration rates. 
 One drawback of the OECD data is that they do not report all flows between countries. 
Small flows in particular are likely to be underreported. Pedersen et al. (2008) have constructed 
an impressive data set including 27 OECD destination countries and 129 source countries, for 
the period 1990-2000. They show that the determinants of emigration differ across countries. 
They grouped countries in various ways (according to the income level and the type of welfare 
state) and identified clear patterns in migration determinants. They find strong evidence of 
network effects in all countries, but these effects are stronger when destination countries offer a 
limited social protection to immigrants. Also, they find no support for the welfare magnet 
hypothesis (i.e. immigrants being attracted by generous welfare systems in developed 
countries). Their indicator of generosity of welfare system, the degree of tax pressure, does not 
have a different effect on poor or rich countries. Finally, they find a different result from Mayda 
(2008) with respect to the effect of sharing a common language or a colonial past. In their 
specification, both have a positive effect on migration flows.  
 
The contribution of this paper in the context of the existing literature is threefold: First, we 
focus on migration flows between developed countries, because we suspect that the mechanisms 
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driving migration between these countries might be different than those driving migration 
between developing and developed countries. Second, by focusing on developed countries only, 
we can investigate specifically the role of cultural barriers to migration by including a number 
of refined indicators capturing cultural distance between countries. Third, we present results 
based on an econometric specification which specifically addresses important econometric 
issues associated with this type of analysis.  
 
3 Theoretical background 
3.1 Theoretical background 
Our ambition is not to provide a new theory of migration. Nevertheless, it is helpful to present a 
simple model of migration to structure our thoughts.  Suppose a world with N countries (N = 
1,…j,…N). An individual i in a given country considers migration opportunities in (N-1) other 
countries. Let us denote the income of individual i in country j  at time t by Yi,j,t. Income 
consists not only of labour income but could also include social welfare benefits, etc.  
Let us assume that Yi,j,t can be split into a “country-specific” component tjY , and an 
“individual-specific component” iµ , the latter being randomly distributed across the 
population: 
itjtji YY µ+= ,,,  
The individual-specific component captures differences in education level, ability, etc.  
Denote by the subscript h the home country (n=h), such that the income of individual i in his 
home country at time t is denoted by Yi,h,t.  Each migration opportunity is associated with 
migration costs Ci,h,,n,t (costs of migration for individual i to migrate from country h  to country 
n at time t). Obviously, we have Ci,h,h,t= 0, ∀i. Migration costs can be split in three parts: Costs 
independent of the country of destination (e.g. loss of local social network, loss of social 
security rights, etc.), costs independent of the country of origin (local regulations) and costs 
specific to the bilateral combination of origin and destination (physical and cultural distance). 
Each component can be further split in a “non-individual-specific” component and an 
“individual-specific” component, the latter modelled as random component.  
The net gain from migration is then:  
tnhitjitji CYNetG ,,,,,,, −=  
 
Suppose individuals have perfect information about their utilities in each location and about the 
migration costs associated with each move. The optimal location decision for individual i living 
in country h (at time t-1) is:
 
][maxargmaxarg
,,,,,,,,
*
1,, tnhitji
n
thni
n
thi CYNetGn −==−  
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Suppose that for each pair of countries, we can order the individuals according to their net 
utility NetGi,n,h. We denote the density function we obtain by fh,n(i). The dependent variable in 
our model is the “gross migration flow” between two countries in a given year, that we denote 
Mj,k,t, as the flow from country j to country k in year t. The aggregate gross migration flow from 
country h to country n is then: ( )∑ ==
−
i
thitnhtnh nnifM * 1,,,,,, /)(  
 
Most theoretical models come down to a specification of the following form7: 
),,,,( ,,,,,, tjkjtktjtkj WCYYgM =  
where Mj,k,t is the migration flow from country j to country k, tjY ,  and tkY , are country-
specific elements (GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population), kjC ,  are the costs of 
migration from country j  to country k and tjW ,  is an aggregate measure of the individual-
component in the migration costs and income: share of young people in the total population, 
participation rate of women, etc. Note that not all variables vary over time.  
 
This model is a static model and one may rightly argue that migration decisions are based on 
difference in lifetime expected values rather than on differences in current values. This is 
relevant since costs are likely to be incurred immediately, while the benefits may accrue over a 
longer period of time. We should bear this in mind when interpreting the results. Secondly, the 
migration process may be dynamic in essence. In particular, migration decisions are likely to be 
correlated over time through the formation of networks in the destination which may reduce the 
costs of migration for future migrants. The presence of network effects would imply that 
migration flows in period t are determined by past migration flows. The worry in terms of our 
empirical analysis is that these dynamic effects may bias the estimates of the other variables. 
For example, suppose that migration decisions are mainly driven by network effects. Then if the 
size of these networks is correlated with for example our distance variables, then our estimates 
of the effects of these variables on current migration flows will be biased. This is a concern if, 
for example, these variables may have mattered in the past and matter less now. If we do not 
control for network effects, we may wrongly conclude that these distance variables have 
affected migration flows in the most recent decades. We will address this issue in two ways: 1) 
We will control for the size of local communities (networks) explicitly, 2) We will investigate 
to what extent these networks are themselves correlated with our independent variables.  
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 Some studies have the migration rate as a dependent variable instead of the number of migrants. The migration rate can 
potentially be problematic as a dependent variable if the size of the population in the denominator (origin or destination) is 
correlated with economic variables (See Young (1975) for an extensive discussion on the choice of the dependent variable 
in migration studies). We chose to enter the relative sizes of the population of the countries of origin and destination as 
regressors to avoid this problem.  
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4 Cultural barriers to migration 
Cultural distance between countries seems a priori appealing to explain mobility patterns 
between European countries, since there are indeed large linguistic and cultural differences 
between them. Differences in culture, language, values and norms translate into migration costs 
that reduce the attractiveness of migration. The role of cultural proximity has received some 
attention in the migration literature, particularly because of the empirical observation of 
geographical clustering of immigrants. It is well-known that immigrants tend to locate in areas 
populated by people with similar ethnic backgrounds. Edin et al. (2003) show that this 
geographical clustering can to some extent help immigrants settling in the country and enhances 
their economic success. We can extrapolate the argument at a higher level. If there are benefits 
to living in a cultural environment that is close to one’s own cultural background, one would 
expect to observe larger migration flows between countries that are culturally close to each 
other.  
 The concept of culture is hard to define, let alone to measure in a meaningful way. 
Broadly defined, culture is the set of communication habits, norms, values which are shared by 
a community. There are many potential problems associated with measuring subjective aspects 
of culture. For this reason, we concentrate first on the more objective characteristics of culture: 
language and religion. Then we introduce two indicators based on measures of norms and 
values from the sociological literature.  
 A major challenge in the construction of these indicators comes from the fact that the 
cultural and linguistic profile of countries reflects, at least partly, past migration flows. Take for 
example Luxembourg, which has seen large immigration flows from Portugal in the seventies 
and now counts 14.4% of Portugese-speaking people in the population8. Because of this large 
migration movement, one could argue that Portugal and Luxembourg are now culturally closer 
to each other. The challenge is then to say whether it is the cultural proximity that triggers the 
current migration flows between Portugal and Luxembourg, or whether it is simply the case that 
the tastes of Portuguese migrants are correlated, such that they will keep migrating to similar 
destinations over time. We build our indicators in a way that should minimize the chance that 
they will capture simple correlations of tastes.  
The indicators of cultural and linguistic differences that we have constructed are much more 
refined than what has been used in the literature so far. Empirical studies have often used very 
rough and approximate indicators, like a dummy variable for common language. Our measures 
should provide a significant improvement on these existing indicators. We use four different 
variables: linguistic distance, religious distance and cultural distance measures based on two 
different sources. In the empirical analysis we will show that these indicators have a substantial 
added value.  
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Linguistic distance  
We first propose an indicator of the linguistic distance between two countries. We concentrate 
on official languages instead of spoken languages, as the latter are more likely to reflect recent 
migration trends. Official languages have long been in place. It is harder to believe in a 
correlation between the current migration flows and those which triggered the establishment of 
official languages. The indicator of linguistic distance is defined as follows: 
 
{ }},{max1
,
jiproximity
BjAi ∈∀∈∀
−
 
where i and j are indices for official languages in country A and B respectively, and proximity is 
the measure constructed by Dyen et al. (1992), a group of linguists who built a measure of 
distance between Indo-European languages based on the proximity between a sample of words 
from each language. For countries that have more than one official language, we choose the 
highest value of proximity measured on all possible pairs of official languages. 
 Our indicator ranges from 0 for no linguistic distance to nearly 1 for high linguistic 
distance. For example, Belgium and France have a distance value of 0 because both have 
French as one of their official languages. For Switzerland and Portugal, which do not share a 
common language, we use the distance measure of Portuguese versus Italian, as they are 
linguistically closest according to the proximity measure. We refer to the appendix for more 
details. We use the same distance measures for Icelandic and Norwegian, as Norwegian was not 
in the data but belongs to the same sub-group in the linguistic classification tree (see Appendix). 
Finnish was not in the data either, because it is not an Indo-European language. Since it belongs 
to another language group, we set the distance equal to 1 for all Indo-European languages. The 
data are presented in the appendix (Table A.3).  
 
Religious distance 
Most countries do not have an official “religion”, so we use survey statistics to build an 
indicator of religious proximity. The large majority of the population in OECD countries 
belongs to one of the three Christian groups (Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy). The 
measure we constructed corresponds to the probability of drawing two individuals, one in each 
country, who would have a different religion. The corresponding formula reads as: 
 
.1
,,, ∑−=
i
BiAiBA ssDISTREL  
The religious distance is equal to 1 minus the probability of drawing two people with the same 
religion.  si,A and si,B are the respective shares with religion i in countries A and B.  
To minimize the influence of recent migration flows, we only counted religious groups that are 
larger than 1% of the population. Note that countries are always strongly dominated by one 
specific religion, such that the role of migration movements in determining the current religious 
beliefs has probably been small anyway. The data are reported in the appendix (Table A.4). 
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Another way of measuring cultural differences is by measuring norms and values directly. 
Sociologists have built a number of measures of “norms and values”, and have collected data on 
these measures across a large number of countries. We will use two large sets of measures 
widely used in the sociological literature.  
 
Cultural distance (Hofstede) 
The first comprehensive set of measures is provided by Hofstede (1991, 2001). He proposed a 
measure of cultural orientation of countries, based on a survey of 117,000 IBM employees 
across 50 countries and 3 multi-country regions. The original data were collected at two 
different points in time: 1968 and 1972. Although these data are collected more than 40 years 
ago, they are assumed to reflect values that are strongly embedded in centuries-old cultures. To 
further ensure the timeliness of the identified cultural concepts, only data that remained stable 
across both surveys were kept. According to Hofstede (2001), recent replications show no loss 
of validity.  
 Hofstede distinguished at first four and later five dimensions on which country cultures 
differ. The original four cultural dimensions with the corresponding definitions from Hofstede 
(2001, pp.xix-xx) between brackets are:  
1. Power distance (“the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally”) 
2. Uncertainty avoidance (“the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel either 
uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations”) 
3. Individualism versus collectivism  (“the degree to which individuals are supposed to look 
after themselves or remain integrated into groups”) 
4. Masculinity versus feminity (“the distribution of emotional roles between the genders”) 
 
Later, Hofstede added a fifth dimension of national culture. This new dimension grasped the 
long-term versus short-term orientation (Confucian dynamism) in a society and was 
independent of the IBM survey, but instead based on a Chinese values survey. As the source is 
different and the data are not available for all countries, we exclude this dimension in our 
calculation of a measure of cultural distance. So we used the original four dimensions to 
compute a composite index of cultural distance between countries, following the strategy 
proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988): 
∑
=
−
=
4
1
2
,,
,
)(
4
1
k k
kjki
ji V
II
CD  
where CDi,j is the cultural distance between country i and country j, Ii,k is the Hofstede’s score 
for country i with respect to the cultural dimension k. Finally, Vk is the variance of the indicator 
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of dimension k for all countries included in the sample of Hofstede. Data are reported in the 
appendix (Table A.5).  
 
Cultural distance (Inglehart and Baker) 
The second comprehensive set of cultural measures is the World Value Survey. The Survey 
covers 65 countries in the world, including 18 of the countries included in our data set. Inglehart 
and Baker (2000) did a factor analysis based on the various waves of the survey and 
summarized the data around two major dimensions (dimension1 and dimension2 here after): 1) 
Traditional versus secular-rational and 2) survival versus self-expression values. Traditional 
societies are defined with respect to a series of variables such as the level of tolerance for 
abortion, divorce and homosexuality, the emphasis of male dominance in economic and 
political life, the importance of family life and parental authority and the emphasis on religion. 
The survival/self-expression dimension corresponds to the level of trust, tolerance, subjective 
well-being, political activism, and self-expression.  
 
On the basis of these two dimensions, we computed an indicator of cultural distance between 2 
countries (i and j) as follows: 
 
22
,
)22()11( jijiji DimensionDimensionDimensionDimensionartDistIngleh −+−=  
The data are reported in the appendix (Table A.6).  
 
Interdependence between the various cultural measures 
One may wonder whether these indicators are strongly correlated with each other and therefore 
not add very much independently. We report the correlation coefficients between these different 
measures, including a measure of physical distance in Table A.7 below.  
 
[Table A.7 about here] 
 
The correlation coefficients between the different distance measures are surprisingly low and 
often even negative. This suggests that these measures capture different dimensions of culture. 
Linguistic distance has a clear interpretation. The costs of communication directly increase with 
linguistic distance. For example, it is often not very hard to understand a different language that 
is linguistically close to your own and therefore helps to reduce migration costs. The measure of 
religious distance broadly groups pairs of countries into two groups:  countries that are either 
very close to each other (when they belong to the same religious tradition) or far away from 
each other (when they do not belong to the same religious tradition). Both the Hofstede and the 
Inglehart and Baker measures seek to find an overarching pattern of norms and values and show 
much more variation across pairs of countries. Both measures summarise culture along different 
dimensions and the underlying data sources differ substantially. Therefore it could be expected 
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that they also grasp different dimensions of culture. A good example illustrating the differences 
between these measures is Greece. Greece is far away from the other countries both in terms of 
linguistic and religious distance; but there is much more variation in the sociological measures 
of cultural distance. Thus, in summary, we would expect that these various measures 
complement each other in providing a richer picture of cultural proximity between countries. A 
comprehensive discussion of the different cultural dimensions can be found in Vinken et al. 
(2004) 
 
5 Estimation of the migration equation 
In this section we present our estimation strategy. Before turning to the estimation results, we 
first give a brief description of the data we use and discuss the econometric specification in 
some detail. 
5.1 Data 
We will now describe successively the variables and data used in the empirical analysis. Details 
about coverage and sources for all variables can be found in the appendix. 
 
Migration flows 
 We use different sources to get a complete overview of the relevant migration flows. 
We start with collecting data from the OECD, based on the Continuous Reporting System on 
Migration (SOPEMI). The drawback of these data is that they include flows from a selected 
number of countries of origin only. Small inflows will be grouped by region or under the label 
“other countries”. In order to constitute a more detailed data set, we use information provided 
by the Migration Policy Institute, using the same sources as the OECD (national statistical 
offices), but reporting more detailed information. These data were available for Australia, 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the USA9. For the other countries, we use information provided by the National Statistical 
Offices. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the average migration flows between any pair of 
countries in our data set. 
 Although we believe that the data we use are the most appropriate for this empirical 
research, they have their limitations as well. We should be aware of the special features of our 
data set. First, the data measures movements in population rather than in labour. It is an 
aggregate measure composed of different types of migrants with different motives. Second, the 
data is not perfectly homogenous across countries. Countries register migration flows in 
different ways. The most common way of registering foreigners is by citizenship. Some 
countries, however, register the foreign population according to their country of birth or country 
of previous residence.  Third, another important difference between countries is the timing of 
                          
9
 These data are on-line on the website www.migrationinformation.org 
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the registration (duration of stay). The European Economic Area agreement has modified the 
registration requirements for citizens of these countries. This is mainly a problem for the UK 
data, since the UK stopped requiring a grant settlement. The number of people registered from 
EEA countries therefore underestimates the actual flows. Moreover, the UK stopped registering 
migrants from EEA countries since 1998.  
  
Independent variables 
 
Population sizes 
Since our dependent variable is the flow of migration between two countries over a given year, 
we need to control for population sizes at origin and destination. The inclusion of the population 
size at origin is intuitive, the inclusion of the population size at destination allows us to control 
for possible gravity effects. This specification is the most flexible specification to take account 
of possible gravity or scale effects, in particular it does not impose the elatisticity of outflows to 
population to be equal to 1. 
 
Economic variables 
We will control for the lagged GDP per capita (in constant $ prices and PPP adjusted), as well 
as for the unemployment rates at origin and destination. These should capture the economic 
push and pull factors.  
 
Demographic variables 
We will control for a number of variables describing the demographic distribution of the 
population of the country of origin in dimensions that may matter for migration: share of 
tertiary educated, participation rate of women and the share of young people (20-39) as 
percentage of the total population. Also, we control for the population at origin and at 
destination.  
 
Cultural barriers 
We will control for the various measures of cultural distance described above. In addition, we 
will control for the share of population from the country of origin in the country of destination 
to capture possible network effects.  
 
Migration policy 
Countries differ in their immigration policies and regulations. Developed countries, and in 
particular the European Union, often have a dual system, i.e. imposing different regulations 
according to the country of origin. The most striking example is provided by the European 
Economic Area, where the movement of workers across borders is free. We directly measure 
for the effect of “open borders” by introducing a dummy variable equal to 1 if both countries 
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allow free movement of workers between them (European Economic Area or New Zealand-
Australia).  
 
Additional variables 
Other variables will be considered in the robustness analysis, such as measures of the generosity 
of the unemployment benefit system (gross replacements rates at origin and destination), as well 
as generosity of the social security system (share of social expenditures in the GDP), to capture 
possible welfare magnet effects.  
5.2 Econometric specification 
The independent variable in our analysis is the total inflow from country j to country k. Figure 1 
shows a histogram of this variable, where inflows have been grouped by intervals of 10 people. 
The distribution is extremely skewed to the left, with a very high frequency of small numbers. 
A second important characteristic of our dependent variable is its discrete and non-negative 
nature. For these reasons, standard linear regression techniques may not be the most appropriate 
method to analyze these data.  
 There are two alternative methodologies one could use to deal with this type of data in 
a better and more efficient way. First, we could simply transform the dependent variable in its 
logarithm, which would come down to estimating a general linearized model. This method has 
been used previously in the literature. However, a recent paper of  Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) shows that the estimated elasticities then can be highly misleading as they neglect the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. They illustrate their argument for a particular application, the 
gravity equation for trade, but the same argument holds for the topic under consideration here. 
 Therefore we opt for a different strategy. We estimate a negative binomial model 
(Cameron and Trivedi (1986)), which better fits the distribution of our dependent variable and 
allows for overdispersion.  
Formally:  
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where ui follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance θ.  
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λ which allows for over-dispersion (which is typically present in 
this type of data).  
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Both specifications, the linear model with the log-transformed dependent variable and the 
negative binomial model, are examples of generalized linear models.  These generalized models 
may require additional adjustments in order to take account of the structure of the data. First, 
our data has a panel structure, i.e. we have repeated observations for each panel. The 
assumption of independency of observations across time (within panels) is unlikely to be 
satisfied. To test this, we analyze the residuals of a linear regression of the log-transformed 
dependent variable including all cultural and institutional variables as covariates.10  
 A Wooldrigde (2002) test confirms the presence of autocorrelation in the error terms 
of the same panels: The F-statistic F(1,309) = 8.957, which rejects the hypothesis of no first-
order correlation at the 1% level. One way of correcting for the within-panel correlation is to 
estimate a population-averaged negative binomial model which specifies the within-correlation 
structure of the panel directly. We will follow this approach in this paper. 
 A second characteristic of our data is that we observe for each country a series of 
inflows and outflows. Flows involving the same country are likely to be correlated if we do not 
control for country-specific factors. For example, there might be reasons why the United States 
attracts migrants of all countries which are not directly observed. We could therefore face a 
problem of correlation between the error terms of different panels. It appears that the problem of 
cross-correlation is mainly present between groups involving the same country of destination. 
We therefore introduce fixed effects for the country of destination to correct for the correlation 
between panels.  
5.3 Estimation results 
We present here the results of the negative binomial specification. We will present a robustness 
analysis with alternative econometric specifications in Section 5.3.6. 
5.3.1 Traditional variables 
 Table 1 (col. (1)) presents estimation results corresponding to a “traditional” 
specification, including controls for economic and demographic variables, as well as measures 
of physical proximity (physical distance and border sharing).   
 Let us first comment on the effects of the “traditional” economic variables.. The signs 
of the GDP-variables correspond to what we would expect, i.e. migration flows tend to go from 
poorer countries to richer countries. The effects of a 1% higher GDP per capita in the 
destination country or a 1% lower GDP per capita in the origin country are similar; they both 
raise the flow of migrants between both countries with about 0.6%. This is a bit higher than 
what is found on average in the empirical literature, but falls well within the range of reported 
results. Ederveen and Bardsley (2004) present a meta-analysis of 26 empirical studies and 
                          
10
 The exact results are not presented here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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conclude that the average wage elasticity is 0.43%. These numbers may look rather small, but 
note that they capture the effects of differences in income on migration in one year. Over a 
number of years, a permanent difference of 1% in income has large implications for migration. 
 Second, we find that the unemployment rate at destination decreases immigration 
flows. The implied elasticity of our estimate for the destination country is that a 1% higher 
unemployment rate (i.e. 8.08% instead of 8.00%) lowers migration with 0.21%. This estimate is 
well in line with earlier research. Ederveen and Bardsley (2004) report an average elasticity of -
0.15. The effect of the unemployment rate in the country of origin on the other hand is not 
statistically significant. This is in line with the findings in a number of earlier studies, e.g. Faini 
and Venturini (1994) and Hatton and Williamson (2002), and could be due to the fact that 
unemployed people are credit-constrained and are therefore not able to migrate.11 One extension 
we will look at in one of the following sections is whether the generosity of the unemployment 
benefit system has any influence on migration flows.  
 Turning to the role of demographica characteristics, we find a positive, but not 
significant correlation between the share of young people in the country of origin and migration 
flows. The other two demographic variables have an effect opposite to what we would expect. 
Indeed, our estimates suggest that the share of tertiary workers has a negative, although 
insignificant, impact on immigration and that the participation rate of women increases 
immigration flows. These effects are opposite to what we would expect. The story may be that 
these indicators capture some attributes of more developed countries, often characterized by a 
higher level of human capital and a higher participation rate of women. Female participation 
may also have a positive effect on migration flows because it increase the stock of potential 
labour migrants.  
 Finally, we find that the physical distance, measured in kilometres between capital 
cities has a negative effect on migration flows. Every 100 extra kilometres of distance lower 
migration with 0.6%. Sharing a border, on the other hand, significantly increases the flows. 
Migration flows between neighbouring countries are more than twice as large as flows between 
countries without a common border. Finally, we find that there are significantly larger 
migration flows between countries that allow free movement of people.  
 
[Table.1 about here] 
5.3.2 Cultural barriers 
We now turn to the role of cultural distance between countries. We first start by introducing the 
simple dummy for sharing a common language, which is the most common way of controlling 
for linguistic proximity in the literature so far (Table 1, column (2)). We find that, indeed, 
                          
11
 In addition, there might be a trade-off with respect to GDP per capita. The meta-analysis of Ederveen and Bardsley (2004) 
concludes that studies that include only unemployment and not GDP per capita report significantly higher coefficients.  
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sharing a common language significantly increases migration flows. In fact, the effect is 
comparable in magnitude to the effect of sharing a border. We then introduce our additional 
indicators of linguistic distance (col. (3)) and religious distance (col. (4)). We find that these 
two indicators also have a significant negative effect, in addition to the common language 
dummy. We also notice that the estimated importance of a common border decreases with the 
inclusion of cultural distance measures. This means that not only the fact that countries share a 
common border and a common official language is important, but the distance between 
different languages matters as well.  
 In Table 2, we introduce the other measures of cultural distances. Because we miss 
information for several countries for these variables, the size of our sample drops significantly. 
For this reason, we introduce each of the culture variables separately, and report regression 
results excluding these variables but involving the same sample (columns (2) and (4) show 
results based on the same samples as the previous column and excluding the relevant culture 
variable). In all cases, the coefficients for the other variables seem to be affected by the sample 
size rather than by the specific culture variables. In Column (1), we look at the effect of cultural 
distance based on the Hofstede dimensions. This variable has a negative but not significant 
effect. Column (3) presents the results when including the cultural distance variable based on 
Inglehart and Baker factor scores. This variable seems to have more explanatory power than the 
Hofstede variable: Cultural distance, based on measures of norms and values, matters next to 
the other measures of cultural distance (linguistic and religious distance variables).  
 
To get some idea of the magnitude of these effects and the importance for migration flows in 
our sample, we calculated the effects of a one standard deviation increase of the different 
cultural variables and compared the results with the effects for GDP per capita and 
unemployment. Our regression results imply that an increase in linguistic distance with one 
standard deviation lowers the migration flow with 56% (calculated using the estimates in Table 
2). This effect is about 50% higher than the effect of raising GDP per capita in the destination 
country with one standard deviation and much more than a change of one standard deviation in 
unemployment rates. To illustrate further, take two countries which share a common language, 
such as for example Belgium and France and compare them with two countries which do not 
have a common language, such as Spain and France (our linguistic distance indicator is equal to 
0.266 for this pair of countries). All else equal, we calculated that the difference between the 
French and Spanish GDP per capita must be more than 40% larger than the difference between 
the French and Belgian GDP to generate the same immigration flow. Hence, if the French and 
Belgian GDP per capita were equal, the Spanish GDP per capita should be 40% lower than the 
French GDP per capita to generate the same emigration flows, solely because France and Spain 
speak a different language. 
 In a similar vein we could calculate the estimated effects of a change in the other 
measures of cultural distance. An increase of 1% of the religious distance between countries, 
evaluated at the mean, lowers migration with 0.9%. This implies that an increase of the 
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religious distance between countries with one standard deviation lowers migration with 35%. 
Greece is on average the religiously most distant country  in our sample. Compared with the 
average religious distance migration flows involving Greece are about 40% lower. 
 Similarly, an increase of 1% in the Inglehart measure of cultural distance corresponds 
with a fall of migration of 0.33% (and one standard deviation increase implies a 17% lower 
migration flow). For the developed countries in our sample, a one standard deviation change in 
the different measures of cultural distance therefore has a stronger effect than a one standard 
deviation change in the economic variables. 
5.3.3 Network effects 
The results so far suggest that culture matters a lot in explaining migration flows. However, we 
need to be careful with interpreting these results. It could be, for example, that culture has 
mattered in the past and lead to the implantation of communities which were culturally close in 
other countries. It could be that this is the presence of these communities that is now the main 
driving factor of migration flows rather than cultural proximity. To investigate the possible role 
of network effects, we introduce a variable measuring the size of local ethnic groups (i.e. the 
size of the population of the same nationality as the immigrants in the country of destination) 
and investigate how it influences our estimates.  
 The results are reported in Table 3. We find a positive and significant effect of this 
variable. The magnitude of the other cultural variables seems somewhat reduced. However, 
again, part of the reason why the effects of cultural variables change seems to be because of the 
smaller sample size. Nevertheless, we observe a reduction in the magnitude of all coefficients of 
cultural proximity; although they do remain significant. In particular, the effect of linguistic 
distance remains large and significant. As an additional exercise, we investigate the relationship 
between the sizes of these local communities (networks) and all our independent variables, in 
the long run, averaging these over the period 1990-2003. The results are reported in Table 4. 
The correlation between these cultural distance variables and the size of networks is, except for 
linguistic distance, low or insignificant. Thus, we fail to find strong evidence that the sizes of 
existing communities are correlated with cultural distance. These results suggest that migration 
in the past may not have been driven as much by cultural proximity than recent migration. This 
is in line with the historical description of migration patterns between European countries for 
example which in the past seem to have been driven by economic factors.  
5.3.4 Migration between countries with open borders 
The next question we ask is whether cultural distance matters as much (or maybe more) 
between countries which have open borders. One motivation for the analysis of cultural barriers 
in this paper is the “European immobility puzzle”, arguing that cultural distance may explain 
why mobility is relatively low in Europe, despite the principle of free mobility. In Table 5, we 
present results including country pairs which have open borders only, that is, that are members 
of the European Union or European Economic Area. We find that culture does matter, but only 
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the coefficients of “common language” and “religious distance” remain large and significant. 
On the other hand, the effects of linguistic distance and cultural distance (Hofstede) are not 
significant. We also fail to find evidence for network effects within the European Economic 
Area. The other variables seem to matter less as well, for example, sharing a border or the 
physical distance between capital cities have a lower effect than when we consider the larger 
sample of countries. Maybe contrary to our expectation, the economic variables do play a large 
and significant role, the estimated coefficients of the GDP/capita variables for example are 
larger than for the larger sample. Thus, we conclude that mobility between European countries 
does respond both to cultural and economic differentials.  
5.3.5 Extensions 
We extend our empirical analysis by including information about the generosity of the 
unemployment benefit systems in the country of origin and of destination. We use data on the 
gross replacement rates, provided by the OECD. Since we did not have information for all 
countries, our sample was substantially reduced when including these two variables. The results 
are shown in Table 6. We find here that the gross replacement rate in the country of origin has a 
significant negative effect on emigration. This confirms the hypothesis that unemployed 
workers may not be willing to move because they have a sufficient income in their home 
country.  Note that the unemployment rate variables are not significant anymore, but this is due 
to the reduction in sample. The second column shows the results based on the same small 
sample, excluding the replacement rates variables. The coefficients for all other variables 
remain essentially the same. 
 The second extended specification we investigate is one controlling for the level of 
social expenditures in the country of origin and destination. This is to test whether migration 
flows are driven by differences in social benefits. Migrants could be attracted by countries with 
generous social security systems, a phenomenon that is usually referred to as the “welfare 
magnet effect” (see Borjas 1999b). The number of observations drops to a large extent. The 
estimates we find are exactly opposite to what one would expect (note that including the gross 
replacement rate or not does not affect the results). There is less immigration in countries with 
more generous social security systems than in others. The welfare magnet hypothesis does not 
find support here, when considering developed countries only. Preferably we would 
differentiate by skill level, as generous welfare states are presumably particularly attractive for 
low-skilled migrants, but our data do not allow a more alaborate strategy. 
 
5.3.6 Robustness analysis 
The last exercise we do is a robustness check of our results across econometric specifications. 
We compare our baseline specification (including cultural variables). We present results based 
on a population-average model with the dependent variable being the logarithm of the inflow, 
and a specification based on the inflow rate. In essence, the results are very similar across these 
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specifications. There is only a difference for the estimated coefficient of the effect of open 
borders, which is significant in our baseline specification and is less precisely estimated in the 
two other specifications. Thus, overall, it seems that our econometric specification is not crucial 
in identifying the effects we have found, in particular the effects of cultural variables.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper provides unique evidence for the role of cultural barriers in migration between 
developed countries. We propose a series of new indicators measuring these barriers in a more 
precise way than has ever been done in the literature. More specific, we introduce more refined 
measures of the cultural distance between countries, correcting for the proximity between 
languages and religions.  
 We present an empirical analysis of migration flows between 22 OECD countries over 
the period 1990-2003. We find strong evidence of the importance of cultural links between 
countries, going well beyond the simple sharing of a common language. Migration flows 
between countries with closely related languages are likely to be much larger than between 
countries with unrelated languages. Similarly, the proximity in religions and culture also 
stimulates migration.  
 As culture is hard to change, this implies that migration flows between culturally very 
distinct developed countries will remain low for many years to come. Well-designed policies 
can take away many obstacles for migration, like administrative procedures, but this can hardly 
compensate for cultural differences. Europe probably has to accept that it is very difficult to 
substantially increase labour mobility between a number of countries. Judging from the 
importance of linguistic and cultural distances, policies to raise labour mobility could be 
targeted at reducing cultural distance, for example by encouraging foreign language learning.   
 Adjusting to a different culture is just one example of the costs people face when 
migrating to another country. Migration costs include a wide range of obstacles to movement, 
from the obvious costs of physically moving to the costs of settling in a new country. Even if in 
principle workers are free to move, like in the European Economic Area (EEA), they are in 
practice confronted with a series of obstacles hampering their movement, such as the lack of 
recognition of foreign qualifications, the lack of transferability of pension rights, etc. It may be 
valuable to investigate in further research the role of these other – institutional – obstacles.  
 In conclusion, our results show that cultural barriers play a crucial role in migration, 
and do a better job in explaining migration patterns between developed countries than 
differentials in economic variables. This paper shows that migration costs have a large potential 
in explaining migration patterns, leaving the door open to more research on identifying more of 
these costs.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 Histogram of inflows (width = 10) 
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Table 1 – Determinants of migrant flows  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable inflow inflow inflow inflow 
lagged GDP/cap dest. (x $1,000) 0.0339 0.0289 0.0406 0.0500 
 (0.0085)** (0.0059)** (0.0092)** (0.0094)** 
lagged GDP/cap origin . (x $1,000) -0.0309 -0.0128 -0.0520 -0.0611 
 (0.0086)** (0.0063)* (0.0092)** (0.0093)** 
lagged unempl. rate dest. -0.0273 -0.0284 -0.0295 -0.0299 
 (0.0046)** (0.0031)** (0.0050)** (0.0051)** 
lagged unempl. rate origin 0.0031 0.0004 -0.0059 -0.0088 
 (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
population dest. -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0060 -0.0061 
 (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0046) 
population origin 0.0084 0.0073 0.0094 0.0100 
 (0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0010)** 
share tertiary educated origin -0.0054 -0.0087 -0.0165 -0.0091 
 (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0074)* (0.0074) 
share young origin 0.0314 0.0112 0.0554 0.0615 
 (0.0436) (0.0444) (0.0441) (0.0440) 
partic. rate women origin 0.0200 0.0109 0.0208 0.0175 
 (0.0039)** (0.0029)** (0.0041)** (0.0042)** 
distance (1000 km) -0.0584 -0.0649 -0.0660 -0.0595 
 (0.0133)** (0.0135)** (0.0132)** (0.0132)** 
border sharing 1.1490 0.8491 0.6056 0.4125 
 (0.1853)** (0.2005)** (0.2060)** (0.2090)* 
open borders 0.0672 0.0655 0.0814 0.1137 
 (0.0218)** (0.0147)** (0.0237)** (0.0241)** 
common language  0.8338 0.5588 0.7658 
  (0.2096)** (0.2190)* (0.2202)** 
linguistic distance   -1.2395 -0.8045 
   (0.2636)** (0.2702)** 
religious distance    -1.3956 
    (0.2333)** 
Constant 5.6475 6.4156 5.3886 6.1121 
 (1.3456)** (1.3518)** (1.3458)** (1.3528)** 
Observations 2698 2698 2698 2698 
Number of panels 314 314 314 314 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1% 
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Table 2 – Determinants of migration inflows – The role of culture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable inflow inflow inflow inflow 
lagged GDP/cap 
dest. 
0.1238 0.1203 0.0829 0.0917 
 (0.0228)** (0.0227)** (0.0178)** (0.0192)** 
lagged GDP/cap 
origin 
-0.0877 -0.0821 -0.0507 -0.0607 
 (0.0185)** (0.0184)** (0.0162)** (0.0174)** 
lagged unempl. rate 
dest. 
-0.0211 -0.0208 0.0015 0.0013 
 (0.0085)* (0.0085)* (0.0072) (0.0079) 
lagged unempl. rate 
origin 
-0.0046 -0.0033 -0.0098 -0.0072 
 (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0074) 
population dest. -0.0148 -0.0140 -0.0051 -0.0053 
 (0.0067)* (0.0067)* (0.0053) (0.0057) 
population origin 0.0102 0.0104 0.0102 0.0103 
 (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** 
share tertiary 
educated origin 
-0.0065 -0.0046 -0.0195 -0.0193 
 (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0087)* (0.0087)* 
share young origin 0.0866 0.0875 0.1164 0.1412 
 (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0633) (0.0628)* 
partic. rate women 
origin 
0.0150 0.0136 0.0121 0.0144 
 (0.0062)* (0.0062)* (0.0059)* (0.0063)* 
distance (1000 km) -0.0556 -0.0523 -0.0502 -0.0538 
 (0.0142)** (0.0141)** (0.0146)** (0.0145)** 
border sharing 0.5628 0.5625 0.4880 0.4952 
 (0.2304)* (0.2300)* (0.2489)* (0.2470)* 
open borders 0.1265 0.1287 0.0447 0.0673 
 (0.0426)** (0.0426)** (0.0311) (0.0340)* 
linguistic distance -1.6350 -1.7170 -1.7963 -1.9243 
 (0.2874)** (0.2839)** (0.3261)** (0.3193)** 
religious distance -0.4437 -0.5940 -1.3086 -1.4255 
 (0.2903) (0.2753)* (0.3270)** (0.3204)** 
cultural distance 
(Hofstede) 
-0.6188    
(0.3664)    
cultural distance 
(Inglehart) 
  -0.2482  
   (0.1058)*  
Constant 4.4211 4.3726 4.7474 3.7669 
 (1.4692)** (1.4670)** (1.9417)* (1.9345) 
Observations 1997 1997 1846 1846 
Number of panels 246 246 219 219 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3 – Determinants of migration flows – The role of networks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable inflow inflow inflow inflow inflow inflow 
lagged GDP/cap dest. 0.1037 0.0911 0.1427 0.1345 0.1602 0.1460 
 (0.0182)** (0.0170)** (0.0258)** (0.0251)** (0.0277)** (0.0288)** 
lagged GDP/cap origin -0.0812 -0.0727 -0.0865 -0.0905 -0.0844 -0.0793 
 (0.0145)** (0.0137)** (0.0221)** (0.0214)** (0.0244)** (0.0252)** 
lagged unempl. rate 
dest. 
-0.0276 -0.0338 -0.0216 -0.0284 -0.0033 -0.0116 
 (0.0086)** (0.0079)** (0.0103)* (0.0100)** (0.0109) (0.0114) 
lagged unempl. rate 
origin 
-0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0020 
 (0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0112) (0.0117) 
population dest. -0.0117 -0.0078 -0.0174 -0.0135 -0.0155 -0.0106 
 (0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0081)* (0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0085) 
population origin 0.0083 0.0092 0.0082 0.0088 0.0090 0.0101 
 (0.0013)** (0.0013)** (0.0014)** (0.0014)** (0.0015)** (0.0014)** 
share tertiary educated 
origin 
0.0097 0.0000 0.0079 0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0121 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
share young origin 0.0927 0.0871 0.0878 0.0858 0.1267 0.1180 
 (0.0533) (0.0536) (0.0550) (0.0551) (0.0755) (0.0753) 
partic. rate women 
origin 
0.0121 0.0089 0.0050 0.0050 0.0031 -0.0018 
 (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0087) 
distance (1000 km) -0.0592 -0.0634 -0.0612 -0.0677 -0.0550 -0.0566 
 (0.0191)** (0.0191)** (0.0194)** (0.0193)** (0.0199)** (0.0198)** 
border sharing 0.4628 0.3661 0.3705 0.2997 0.4044 0.3175 
 (0.2386) (0.2402) (0.2672) (0.2680) (0.2768) (0.2756) 
open borders 0.1421 0.1499 0.1906 0.2024 0.1137 0.1205 
 (0.0398)** (0.0367)** (0.0485)** (0.0469)** (0.0525)* (0.0548)* 
linguistic distance -1.1420 -1.6562 -1.5322 -1.9956 -1.6786 -2.1735 
 (0.3312)** (0.3289)** (0.3745)** (0.3702)** (0.4214)** (0.4150)** 
religious distance -0.6135 -0.4828 -0.5192 -0.2634 -1.0169 -0.8980 
 (0.3468) (0.3484) (0.3947) (0.3939) (0.4620)* (0.4604) 
cultural distance 
(Hofstede) 
  -0.2216 -0.5680   
  (0.4585) (0.4574)   
cultural distance 
(Inglehart) 
    -0.1144 -0.2151 
     (0.1290) (0.1280) 
share of population of 
origin in dest. 
0.0019  0.0018  0.0018  
 (0.0004)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0004)**  
Constant 3.5264 4.9414 3.7698 4.8734 2.9586 4.6729 
 (1.6547)* (1.6564)** (1.7344)* (1.7335)** (2.3551) (2.3602)* 
Observations 1504 1504 1302 1302 1111 1111 
Number of panels 196 196 170 170 145 145 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 – Determinants of networks (averages over the period 1990-2003 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Log (share of population of origin in destination) 
GDP / capita 
destination 
0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 
 (0.0001)** (0.0001) (0.0001)** 
GDP / capita origin -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0000)** (0.0001)* (0.0000)** 
unempl. rate 
destination 
0.0996 1.0735 0.0939 
 (0.0469)* (0.0951)** (0.0487) 
unempl. rate origin 0.0380 0.0958 0.0094 
 (0.0335) (0.0546) (0.0335) 
population destination -0.0105 0.0077 -0.0086 
 (0.0029)** (0.0027)** (0.0027)** 
population origin 0.0128 0.0117 0.0105 
 (0.0014)** (0.0017)** (0.0014)** 
share tertiary 
educated origin 
-0.0072 -0.0454 0.0029 
 (0.0127) (0.0135)** (0.0131) 
share young origin 0.1247 0.1093 0.0690 
 (0.0560)* (0.0741) (0.0539) 
partic. rate women 
origin 
0.0224 0.0139 0.0142 
 (0.0105)* (0.0126) (0.0121) 
distance (1000 km) -0.1356 -0.1400 -0.1137 
 (0.0304)** (0.0297)** (0.0289)** 
border sharing 0.6195 0.7169 0.6771 
 (0.2464)* (0.2502)** (0.2563)** 
open borders -0.4249 -0.6643 0.0020 
 (0.5591) (0.5517) (0.5309) 
common language 0.4532 0.1122 0.3527 
 (0.2590) (0.2525) (0.2619) 
linguistic distance -1.0612 -1.8128 -1.0675 
 (0.3861)** (0.4541)** (0.3959)** 
religious distance -0.6884 -1.1195 -0.4003 
 (0.3991) (0.4450)* (0.4185) 
cultural distance 
(Ingleheart) 
 -0.0565  
 (0.1149)  
cultural distance 
(Hofstede) 
  -0.0329 
  (0.4190) 
Constant -5.8736 -3.7468 -4.1318 
 (2.5201)* (3.3235) (2.4811) 
Observations 244 166 213 
R-squared 0.80 0.85 0.80 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 – Determinants of migration flows between countries with open borders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 inflow inflow inflow inflow 
lagged GDP/cap 
dest. 
0.0502 0.1833 0.1892 0.1919 
 (0.0149)** (0.0537)** (0.0636)** (0.0553)** 
lagged GDP/cap 
origin 
-0.0795 -0.1712 -0.1400 -0.1437 
 (0.0141)** (0.0345)** (0.0454)** (0.0425)** 
lagged unempl. rate 
dest. 
-0.0396 -0.0188 -0.0231 -0.0240 
 (0.0085)** (0.0208) (0.0290) (0.0240) 
lagged unempl. rate 
origin 
-0.0220 -0.0320 -0.0137 -0.0143 
 (0.0087)* (0.0171) (0.0211) (0.0187) 
population dest. -0.2205 -0.3742 -0.3872 -0.3503 
 (0.0885)* (0.1787)* (0.2619) (0.2224) 
population origin 0.0266 0.0240 0.0187 0.0188 
 (0.0029)** (0.0032)** (0.0039)** (0.0040)** 
share tertiary 
educated origin 
0.0336 0.0505 0.0430 0.0431 
 (0.0135)* (0.0169)** (0.0251) (0.0259) 
share young origin 0.0525 0.0493 0.0543 0.0534 
 (0.0523) (0.0529) (0.0665) (0.0684) 
partic. rate women 
origin 
0.0266 0.0371 0.0303 0.0273 
 (0.0061)** (0.0093)** (0.0126)* (0.0122)* 
distance (1000 km) -0.1409 -0.4466 -0.3400 -0.3687 
 (0.1756) (0.1961)* (0.2639) (0.2699) 
border sharing 0.3505 0.2850 0.2626 0.2895 
 (0.2498) (0.2817) (0.3412) (0.3537) 
common language 0.8328 0.9062 0.9653 1.0543 
 (0.3663)* (0.3537)* (0.4636)* (0.4763)* 
linguistic distance 0.3176 0.1189 0.0773 0.1129 
 (0.3646) (0.4314) (0.5808) (0.5994) 
religious distance -1.9191 -1.3169 -1.2007 -1.2038 
 (0.2616)** (0.3178)** (0.4417)** (0.4566)** 
cultural distance 
(Hofstede) 
 0.2223 0.4035 0.3827 
  (0.4238) (0.5587) (0.5789) 
share of population 
of origin in dest. 
  0.0028  
   (0.0015)  
Constant 11.5299 12.2582 11.0902 11.5779 
 (2.5919)** (3.6878)** (5.2398)* (4.7303)* 
Observations 1411 967 608 608 
Number of panels 202 147 96 96 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6 – Determinants of migration flows – The role of social security 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 inflow inflow inflow inflow 
lagged GDP/cap dest. 0.1583 0.1536 0.0430 0.0495 
 (0.0211)** (0.0217)** (0.0179)* (0.0170)** 
lagged GDP/cap origin -0.0682 -0.0741 -0.0952 -0.0946 
 (0.0173)** (0.0176)** (0.0146)** (0.0145)** 
lagged unempl. rate dest. -0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0176 -0.0223 
 (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0089)* (0.0085)** 
lagged unempl. rate origin -0.0082 -0.0083 0.0036 -0.0021 
 (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0076) 
population dest. -0.0364 -0.0369 -0.0235 -0.0266 
 (0.0061)** (0.0063)** (0.0073)** (0.0070)** 
population origin 0.0086 0.0101 0.0113 0.0114 
 (0.0012)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** (0.0011)** 
share tertiary educated 
origin 
-0.0016 -0.0043 -0.0118 -0.0108 
 (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
share young origin 0.1085 0.0894 0.1214 0.1193 
 (0.0477)* (0.0475) (0.0453)** (0.0454)** 
partic. rate women origin 0.0080 0.0092 0.0283 0.0271 
 (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0056)** (0.0054)** 
distance (1000 km) -0.0599 -0.0535 -0.0567 -0.0530 
 (0.0152)** (0.0150)** (0.0146)** (0.0143)** 
border sharing 0.4889 0.4912 0.5194 0.5002 
 (0.2290)* (0.2283)* (0.2074)* (0.2076)* 
open borders 0.1149 0.1153 0.1058 0.0997 
 (0.0321)** (0.0334)** (0.0377)** (0.0368)** 
linguistic distance -1.6766 -1.6947 -1.5237 -1.4867 
 (0.2849)** (0.2842)** (0.2577)** (0.2578)** 
religious distance -0.8265 -0.7053 -0.9633 -0.9744 
 (0.2782)** (0.2771)* (0.2426)** (0.2428)** 
gross repl. rate dest. -0.0028    
 (0.0037)    
gross repl. rate origin -0.0127    
 (0.0032)**    
social expenditures as 
percentage destination (%) 
  -0.0199  
  (0.0095)*  
social expenditures as 
percentage origin (%) 
  -0.0101  
  (0.0074)  
Constant 4.0237 4.1607 5.1542 4.6725 
 (1.5010)** (1.5018)** (1.4567)** (1.4364)** 
Observations 1699 1699 1797 1797 
Number of panels 260 260 289 289 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 33
 
Table 7 – Determinants of migration flows – Robustness across econometric specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 inflow lninflow lninflowrate 
lagged GDP/cap dest. 0.1238 0.0974 0.0653 
 (0.0228)** (0.0297)** (0.0267)* 
lagged GDP/cap 
origin 
-0.0877 -0.0930 -0.1035 
 (0.0185)** (0.0212)** (0.0196)** 
lagged unempl. rate 
dest. 
-0.0211 -0.0236 -0.0266 
 (0.0085)* (0.0123) (0.0117)* 
lagged unempl. rate 
origin 
-0.0046 0.0004 -0.0132 
 (0.0079) (0.0109) (0.0106) 
population dest. -0.0148 -0.0137  
 (0.0067)* (0.0088)  
population origin 0.0102 0.0104  
 (0.0011)** (0.0010)**  
share tertiary 
educated origin 
-0.0065 0.0035 -0.0113 
 (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
share young origin 0.0866 0.0942 0.1527 
 (0.0459) (0.0420)* (0.0424)** 
partic. rate women 
origin 
0.0150 0.0176 0.0302 
 (0.0062)* (0.0069)* (0.0069)** 
distance (1000 km) -0.0556 -0.0635 -0.0576 
 (0.0142)** (0.0133)** (0.0136)** 
border sharing 0.5628 0.6265 0.2317 
 (0.2304)* (0.2078)** (0.2140) 
linguistic distance -1.6350 -1.2905 -1.5728 
 (0.2874)** (0.2661)** (0.2702)** 
religious distance -0.4437 -0.5548 -0.9934 
 (0.2903) (0.2663)* (0.2747)** 
cultural distance 
(Hofstede) 
-0.6188 -0.6044 -0.1016 
(0.3664) (0.3321) (0.3429) 
open borders 0.1265 0.0782 0.1029 
 (0.0426)** (0.0625) (0.0609) 
Constant 4.4211 3.6531 -6.8383 
 (1.4692)** (1.4356)* (1.4422)** 
Observations 1997 1965 1965 
Number of panels 246 242 242 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States  
 
 
 
Description Source 
Inflow Immigration inflow (in thousands), 
yearly data 
See next section 
GDP per capita  Gross Domestic Product per Capita 
(constant prices 1990, $), PPP, yearly 
data 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total 
Economy Database 
Unemployment rate  Standardized unemployment rates, 
yearly data 
OECD on-line statistics 
Population 
 
Total population of (in thousands), 
yearly data 
World Bank 
Distance (km) Distance in kilometers between capital 
cities of pairs of countries 
Western Cotton Research Laboratory – U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (Internet Source: 
http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/capitals.htm) 
Border sharing Dummy variable 
0 – No common border 
1 – Common border 
World Atlas 
Share young  Share of young people (20-39) as 
percent of the total population, 1998  
International Labor Organization, 
Fertig and Schmid (2002) 
Participation rate women  Participation rate of women, yearly 
data 
OECD on-line statistics 
 
Share tertiary educated  Share of tertiary educated workers in 
the total population (non-university and 
university), 1996 
OECD, Education at a Glance, 1999. 
Common language dummy Dummy variable = 1 if (one of) the pair 
of countries shares an official 
language.  
English: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom, United States 
French: Belgium, Canada, France, Switzerland 
German: Austria, Germany, Switzerland 
Italian: Italy, Switzerland 
Dutch: Belgium, Netherlands 
Linguistic distance Index of the linguistic distance 
between countries (varies between 0 
(perfect similarity) to 1 (no proximity)) 
Dyen et al. (1992) 
Religious distance 
 
Index of the religious proximity 
between countries (varies between 0 
(perfect similarity) to 1 (no proximity)) 
Belot and Ederveen (2006) 
Cultural distance (Hofstede) Index of cultural distance between 
countries, as captured by the four 
Hofstede (1991) indicators 
Hofstede (1991) 
Calculations by Belot and Ederveen (2008) 
Cultural distance (Inglehart) Index of cultural distance between 
countries, as captured Baker and 
Inglehart (2000) 
Calculations by Belot and Ederveen (2008) 
Share of foreign population  Stock of population of the nationality of 
the country of origin in the country of 
destination (yearly data) 
OECD Trends in International Migration Statistics 
and Migration Policy Institute for Australia 
(1991,1996,2001), Austria (1991,2001), Canada 
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(1991, 1996, 2000, 2001), Denmark (1990-2003), 
Finland (1990,1995,2002), Germany (1995-2002), 
Greece (1991,2001) and USA (1995-2003) 
For Australia, Canada, USA: Stock of Foreign 
Population in COUNTRYA by country of birth 
(COUNTRY B) 
Linear interpolation for the years in between 
Open Dummy variable equal to 1 if both 
countries have open borders  
 
Gross replacement rate Summary measure of benefit 
entitlement (Average Gross 
Replacement rates), yearly data 
OECD 2002, Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators 
Only available for odd years. Linear interpolation for 
even years.  
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Data source for data on migration inflows 
COUNTRY VARIABLE PERIOD DATA SOURCE 
Australia Inflow by country of birth 
complete 
1990 - 2002 Migration Policy Institute 
Austria Inflow by country of nationality 
complete 
1996-2001 Migration Policy Institute 
Belgium Inflow by country of nationality 
Almost all countries of origin 
1993-2002 Institut National de 
Statistiques  (Belgium) 
Canada Inflow of permanent settlers by country of origin 
2 countries of origin 
1991-2000 OECD 
Denmark Inflow by country of previous residence 
complete 
1990-2002 Migration Policy Institute 
Finland Inflow by country of nationality 
complete 
1997-2001 Migration Policy Institute 
France Inflow by country of nationality 
complete 
1994-1999 Institut National d’Etudes 
Demographiques (France) 
Germany Inflow by country of nationality 
complete 
1995-2002 Migration Policy Institute 
Greece Usual resident population by place of residence one 
year before the Census (2001) 
All countries 
2001 National Statistical Service of 
Greece 
Iceland Inflow by country of previous residence 
complete 
1990-2003 Icelandic Statistics 
Ireland Resident population by place of residence on year 
before the census (2002) 
Almost all countries 
1994-2001 
 
 
Central Statistics Office 
(Ireland) 
 
Italy Inflow of foreign population by nationality 
2 countries 
1998-2000 OECD 
Luxembourg Inflow of foreign population by nationality 
complete 
1990-2003 Statec Luxembourg 
Netherlands Inflow of foreign-born population by country of birth 
complete 
1995-2002 Migration Policy Institute 
New Zealand Inflow of permanent and long-term arrivals by 
country of birth 
3 countries 
1999-2000 OECD 
Norway Inflow of foreign population by country of nationality 
complete 
1999-2001 Migration Policy Institute 
Portugal Inflow of foreign population by  country of nationality 
7 countries 
1992-2000 OECD 
Spain Data on immigration by country of origin (previous 
residence): Spanish + Foreigners 
1998-2003 INE 
Spanish National Statistical 
Institute 
Sweden Inflow of foreign population by country of nationality 
complete 
1992-2001 Migration Policy Institute 
Switzerland Inflow of foreign population by country of nationality 
10 countries 
1991-2000 OECD 
United Kingdom Inflow of foreign population by country of nationality 
complete 
1991-2001 Migration Policy Institute 
United States  
 
Inflow of foreign-born population by country of birth 
complete 
1990-2002 Migration Policy Institute 
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Data availability  
See next Table.  
X means that the series is available for all years 
- means that it is not available for any year.  
Linear interpolation for the following variables: FOROPOPB, SOCA, SOCB, GRRB 
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 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland 
INFLOW 1991-2000 1998-2000 1991-2000 1991-2000 1990-1999 1992-2000 1991-2000 1990-1999 1998 1990-2003 1994-2001 
GDPCAPA/B X X X X X X X X X X X 
URA/B X 1994-2000 X X X X X X X 1991-2000 X 
SCHOOLA/B X X X X X X X X X X X 
POPULATIONA/B X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTKM X X X X X X X X X X X 
BORDER X X X X X X X X X X X 
SHAREYOUNGB X X X X X X X X X X X 
PARTWOMENB X 1994-2002 X X X X X X X 1991-2002 X 
TERTIARYB X X X X X X X X X X X 
COMLANG X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTLANG1 X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTLANG X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTREL X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTHOF X X X X X X X X X X X 
FORPOPB 
1991, 1996, 
2001 
1995, 2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1991, 1996, 
2001 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1999 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1991, 2001 - 1995, 2001 
OPEN X X X X X X X X X X X 
HOMEB X X X X X X X X X - X 
TRANSTOTFEEB X X X X X X X X X - X 
PENSPORB X X X X X X X X X X X 
GRRB 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
- 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
SOCB 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-96, 
1998 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-95, 1998 1990-95, 1998 
1990-93, 
1995, 1998 
1994, 1995 
1990-96, 
1998 
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 Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK USA 
INFLOW 1998-2000 1991-2000 1991-2000 1999-2000 1991-2000 1992-2000 1998-2003 1991-2000 1991-2000 1992-2000 1991-2000 
GDPCAPA/B X X X X X X X X X X X 
URA/B X X X X X X X X 1991-2000 X X 
SCHOOLA/B X X X X X X X X X X X 
POPULATIONA/B X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTKM X X X X X X X X X X X 
BORDER X X X X X X X X X X X 
SHAREYOUNGB X X X X X X X X X X X 
PARTWOMENB X X X X X X X X 1991-2002 X X 
TERTIARYB X X X X X X X X X X X 
COMLANG X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTLANG1 X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTLANG X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTREL X X X X X X X X X X X 
DISTHOF X X X X X X X X X X X 
FORPOPB 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
- 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1990, 1995, 
2000 
1995-2003 
OPEN X X X X X X X X X X X 
HOMEB X - X X X - X X X X X 
TRANSTOTFEEB X X X X X X X X X X X 
PENSPORB X X X X X X X X X X X 
GRRB 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
- 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
Odd years 
1961-1999 
SOCB 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-96, 1998 
1990-96, 
1998 
1990-95, 
1998 
1990-96, 
1998 
1990-95, 1998 1990-95, 1998 
1990, 1995, 
1998 
1990-95, 1998 1990-95, 1998 
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Summary statistics 
Table A.1 Summary statistics 
  No obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Migration inflow (units) 3053 1646 3714 0 48309 
GDP per capita (GK $) 6468 18888 4325 9952 34462 
Unemployment rate (%) 6279 7.55 3.86 1.5 23.9 
Population (millions) 6468 32.20 56.93 0.255 290.3426 
Share tertiary educated (%) 6174 21.81 8.69 8 48 
Share young people (%) 6468 29.62 1.31 26.8 32.37 
Participation rate 
women (%) 6237 63.61 11.20 41.1 85.7 
Distance  (km) 6468 4895 5930 173 19838 
Linguistic distance  5320 0.51 0.31 0 1 
Religious distance  6468 0.69 0.27 0.04 1 
Cultural distance 
Inglehart  3360 1.32 .70 .09 3.5 
Cultural distance 
Hofstede  4830 0.30 0.22 0 0.999366 
Stock foreign 
population (thousands) 2654 49.13 124.29 0 1119.591 
Home ownership rate (%) 5292 58.89 13.30 30 81 
Total transaction costs (%) 6174 9.95 4.51 3.5 19 
Pension portability 
index  6468 0.89 0.41 0 1.5 
Gross replacement rate (%) 3780 31.50 11.31 2.5 67 
Social security 
expenditures (%) 4011 23.81 5.28 13.54 36.91 
       
Common language 
dummy  6468 share 0 0.887446   
   share 1 0.112554   
Open border  6468 share 0 0.564626   
   share 1 0.435374   
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Table A.2 Average migration flows between countries 
 Immigration country 
Emigration 
country AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER GRE ICE IRE ITA LUX NLD NOR NZL POR SPA SWE SWI UK USA 
AUS  213 180  285 61 305 1816 1477 25 4997  10 764 122 3569  360 223  2104 1931 
AUT 105  211  114 20 526 11135 293 13 150  35 330 58   480 81 1595  501 
BEL 62 152   138 16 4102 2039 763 19 431  1099 2116 58   2819 76   620 
CAN 743 202 480  249 63 1503 2253 853 38 605  29 676 137   408 174 850 967 15064 
DEN 144 197 398   71 632 2591 133 995 162  152 372 1910   580 1530   589 
FIN 56 247 411  322  494 2976 65 42 149  64 416 1321   846 2993   433 
FRA 269 644 6941  577 115  14333 1091 45 2015  1623 1778 386  376 7213 429 5254  2983 
GER 776 7140 3016  1542 192 8319  11406 143 1952 4381 660 5346 1047  559 12627 946 9542  7214 
GRE 205 464 627  104 31 710 17248  4 114  71 636 41   150 234   1430 
ICE 7 35 53  1074 24 59 232 6    25 68 479    406   128 
IRE 732 111 344  116 25 783 3286 85 7   78 501 54   810 116   5557 
ITA 252 1354 2529  465 80 5005 36445 2356 24 775  517 1255 153  186 3798 246 6476  2431 
LUX 2 37 218  6 0 371 660 73 24 58   39 2   95 2   24 
NLD 356 564 6715  526 62 2010 7619 503 41 746  247  342  222 2612 298 1394  1302 
NZL 13346 35 48  77 10 66 397 26 14 488  5 305     59  1364 862 
NOR 43 106 269  1378 67 487 1034 90  122 25 25 323 31    1924  94 467 
POR 178 450 1696  82 5 7162 18947 36 20   2531 780 56   3324 61   2291 
SPA 71 301 1140  427 63 3896 7942 387 33 1661  126 1157 127  481  224 2534  1437 
SWE 167 438 562  1155 704 1196 3335 536 586 373  111 531 3688   1419    1188 
SWI 240 470 191  125 23 1422 3331 383 16   36 404 59    88  194 868 
UK 10978 946 2874 5725 1184 213 8002 12824 7549 140 23201  358 4648 885 476 577 17588 939 2710  14356 
USA 1402 994 2903 6056 1424 215 4495 15799 4704 274 5615 5845 242 3193 704 1253 307 3041 935 2826 4034  
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Table A.3 Linguistic distance between countries 
 AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER GRE ICE IRE ITA LUX NLD NOR NZL POR SPA SWE SWI UK USA 
AUS 1.00 0.59 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.00 0.24 0.59 0.15 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.59 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.59 0.58 1.00 1.00 
AUT 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.71 0.00 0.24 1.00 0.17 0.55 0.59 0.27 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.59 0.25 0.26 0.63 1.00 0.59 0.59 
BEL 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.16 0.58 0.59 0.80 0.84 1.00 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.73 0.63 1.00 0.59 0.59 
CAN 1.00 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.15 0.55 1.00 0.80 0.59 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.71 0.73 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DEN 0.59 0.71 0.67 0.59 1.00 0.00 0.24 0.71 0.17 0.78 0.59 0.26 0.71 0.67 0.78 0.59 0.25 0.25 0.87 0.71 0.59 0.59 
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FRA 0.24 0.24 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.80 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.71 0.73 0.24 1.00 0.24 0.24 
GER 0.59 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.71 0.00 0.24 1.00 0.17 0.55 0.59 0.27 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.59 0.25 0.25 0.63 1.00 0.59 0.59 
GRE 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.15 0.17 1.00 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 
ICE 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.78 0.00 0.23 0.55 0.18 1.00 0.55 0.25 0.55 0.58 1.00 0.55 0.24 0.24 0.80 0.59 0.55 0.55 
IRE 1.00 0.59 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.00 0.24 0.59 0.15 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.58 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.59 0.59 1.00 1.00 
ITA 0.25 0.27 0.80 0.80 0.26 0.00 0.80 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.25 1.00 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.77 0.79 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.25 
LUX 0.59 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.71 0.00 0.24 1.00 0.17 0.55 0.58 0.27 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.59 0.25 0.25 0.63 1.00 0.59 0.59 
NLD 0.59 0.84 1.00 0.59 0.67 0.00 0.25 0.84 0.16 0.58 0.59 0.25 0.84 1.00 0.58 0.59 0.24 0.25 0.57 0.84 0.59 0.59 
NOR 0.55 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.78 0.00 0.23 0.59 0.18 1.00 0.55 0.25 0.59 0.58 1.00 0.55 0.24 0.24 0.80 0.59 0.55 0.55 
NZL 1.00 0.59 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.00 0.24 0.59 0.15 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.59 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.59 0.59 1.00 1.00 
POR 0.24 0.25 0.71 0.71 0.25 0.00 0.71 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.77 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.00 0.87 0.26 0.77 0.24 0.24 
SPA 0.24 0.26 0.73 0.73 0.25 0.00 0.73 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.79 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.87 1.00 0.25 0.79 0.24 0.24 
SWE 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.87 1.00 0.24 0.63 0.17 0.80 0.59 0.25 0.63 0.57 0.80 0.59 0.26 0.25 1.00 0.63 0.59 0.59 
SWI 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.59 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.59 0.77 0.79 0.63 1.00 0.58 0.58 
UK 1.00 0.59 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.00 0.24 0.59 0.15 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.59 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.59 0.58 1.00 1.00 
USA 1.00 0.59 0.59 1.00 0.59 0.00 0.24 0.59 0.15 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.59 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.59 0.58 1.00 1.00 
Source: Belot and Ederveen (2006), based on Dyen et al. (1992) 
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Table A.4 Religious distance between countries 
 AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER GRE ICE IRE ITA LUX NLD NOR NZL POR SPA SWE SWI UK USA 
AUS 0 0.78 0.8 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.81 1 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.83 0.78 
AUT 0.78 0 0.39 0.63 0.95 0.96 0.34 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.28 0.35 0.24 0.72 0.94 0.86 0.24 0.23 0.94 0.62 0.85 0.75 
BEL 0.8 0.39 0 0.65 0.99 1 0.34 0.73 1 0.99 0.29 0.35 0.24 0.73 0.99 0.88 0.24 0.23 0.99 0.64 0.88 0.78 
CAN 0.79 0.63 0.65 0 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.71 0.99 0.66 0.58 0.62 0.56 0.76 0.65 0.75 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.65 0.75 0.67 
DEN 0.76 0.95 0.99 0.67 0 0.19 0.97 0.65 1 0.17 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.79 0.13 0.53 0.98 0.99 0.12 0.63 0.56 0.49 
FIN 0.77 0.96 1 0.68 0.19 0 0.98 0.66 1 0.19 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.8 0.15 0.54 0.99 1 0.14 0.64 0.57 0.50 
FRA 0.77 0.34 0.34 0.61 0.97 0.98 0 0.7 1 0.97 0.22 0.29 0.18 0.7 0.97 0.86 0.18 0.16 0.97 0.6 0.86 0.75 
GER 0.81 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.7 0 1 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.8 0.63 0.75 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.69 0.76 0.69 
GRE 1 0.98 1 0.99 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ICE 0.76 0.94 0.99 0.66 0.17 0.19 0.97 0.65 1 0 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.78 0.12 0.52 0.97 0.98 0.12 0.63 0.55 0.49 
IRE 0.76 0.28 0.29 0.58 0.97 .97 0.22 0.68 1 0.96 0 0.24 0.11 0.68 0.97 0.85 0.11 0.09 0.96 0.56 0.85 0.73 
ITA 0.78 0.35 0.35 0.62 0.98 0.99 0.29 0.71 1 0.98 0.24 0 0.19 0.72 0.98 0.87 0.19 0.18 0.98 0.61 0.87 0.76 
LUX 0.75 0.24 0.24 0.56 0.98 0.99 0.18 0.67 1 0.97 0.11 0.19 0 0.67 0.98 0.85 0.06 0.04 0.98 0.54 0.84 0.72 
NLD 0.85 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.8 0.7 0.8 1 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.67 0 0.78 0.83 0.67 0.66 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.78 
NOR 0.75 0.94 0.99 0.65 0.13 0.15 0.97 0.63 1 0.12 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.78 0 0.5 0.98 0.99 0.07 0.61 0.53 0.46 
NZL 0.83 0.86 0.88 0.75 0.53 0.54 0.86 0.75 1 0.52 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.5 0 0.85 0.85 0.49 0.72 0.72 0.67 
POR 0.75 0.24 0.24 0.56 0.98 0.99 0.18 0.67 1 0.97 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.67 0.98 0.85 0 0.04 0.98 0.54 0.84 0.72 
SPA 0.74 0.23 0.23 0.56 0.99 1 0.16 0.66 1 0.98 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.66 0.99 0.85 0.04 0 0.99 0.54 0.85 0.72 
SWE 0.74 0.94 0.99 0.64 0.12 0.14 0.97 0.63 1 0.12 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.77 0.07 0.49 0.98 0.99 0 0.6 0.53 0.45 
SWI 0.77 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.6 0.69 1 0.63 0.56 0.61 0.54 0.75 0.61 0.72 0.54 0.54 0.6 0 0.73 0.65 
UK 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.76 0.56 0.57 0.86 0.76 1 0.55 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.53 0.72 0.84 0.85 0.53 0.73 0 0.68 
USA 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.49 0.5 0.75 0.69 1 0.48 0.73 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.46 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.45 0.65 0.68 0 
Source: Belot and Ederveen (2008) 
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Table A.5 Cultural distance between OECD countries (Hofstede dimensions) 
 AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRE NLD NZL NOR POR SPA SWE SWI UK USA 
AUS 0.00 0.20 0.22 0.02 0.34 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.37 0.62 0.26 0.44 0.04 0.02 0.00 
AUT 0.20 0.00 0.39 0.23 0.66 0.40 0.47 0.08 0.41 0.14 0.64 0.13 0.69 0.64 0.37 0.83 0.08 0.23 0.23 
BEL 0.22 0.39 0.00 0.21 0.71 0.28 0.02 0.16 0.13 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.49 0.22 0.06 0.68 0.21 0.35 0.24 
CAN 0.02 0.23 0.21 0.00 0.24 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.25 0.50 0.19 0.30 0.06 0.04 0.02 
DEN 0.34 0.66 0.71 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.58 0.45 1.00 0.35 0.10 0.26 0.07 0.79 0.52 0.03 0.46 0.35 0.35 
FIN 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.42 0.26 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.30 0.14 0.12 0.24 0.28 0.22 
FRA 0.23 0.47 0.02 0.19 0.58 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.16 0.39 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.16 0.04 0.52 0.24 0.36 0.25 
GER 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.45 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.28 0.07 0.35 0.05 0.43 0.42 0.16 0.54 0.01 0.09 0.07 
GRE 0.50 0.41 0.13 0.45 1.00 0.42 0.16 0.28 0.00 0.59 0.64 0.52 0.70 0.09 0.09 0.96 0.35 0.66 0.54 
IRE 0.05 0.14 0.38 0.06 0.35 0.26 0.39 0.07 0.59 0.00 0.39 0.03 0.45 0.72 0.36 0.49 0.04 0.03 0.05 
NLD 0.28 0.64 0.37 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.26 0.35 0.64 0.39 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.45 0.25 0.06 0.39 0.36 0.29 
NZL 0.03 0.13 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.16 0.31 0.05 0.52 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.32 0.61 0.28 0.38 0.04 0.04 0.04 
NOR 0.37 0.69 0.49 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.36 0.43 0.70 0.45 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.31 0.03 0.47 0.45 0.39 
POR 0.62 0.64 0.22 0.50 0.79 0.30 0.16 0.42 0.09 0.72 0.45 0.61 0.47 0.00 0.08 0.68 0.51 0.79 0.65 
SPA 0.26 0.37 0.06 0.19 0.52 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.08 0.00 0.47 0.21 0.38 0.29 
SWE 0.44 0.83 0.68 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.52 0.54 0.96 0.49 0.06 0.38 0.03 0.68 0.47 0.00 0.57 0.48 0.45 
SWI 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.46 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.35 0.04 0.39 0.04 0.47 0.51 0.21 0.57 0.00 0.07 0.05 
UK 0.02 0.23 0.35 0.04 0.35 0.28 0.36 0.09 0.66 0.03 0.36 0.04 0.45 0.79 0.38 0.48 0.07 0.00 0.01 
USA 0.00 0.23 0.24 0.02 0.35 0.22 0.25 0.07 0.54 0.05 0.29 0.04 0.39 0.65 0.29 0.45 0.05 0.01 0.00 
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Table A.6   Cultural distance between OECD countries (Inglehart dimensions) 
 AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER ICE IRE ITA NLD NZL NOR SWE SWI UK USA 
AUS 0.00 1.20 1.24 0.59 1.66 2.06 1.28 1.71 0.82 1.33 1.34 1.99 0.36 1.57 1.73 2.51 0.77 0.84 
AUT 1.20 0.00 1.74 0.62 1.25 1.53 0.12 1.34 0.44 1.45 0.27 2.08 1.07 1.39 1.93 2.20 0.44 1.45 
BEL 1.24 1.74 0.00 0.66 1.08 1.36 0.89 1.17 0.43 1.61 0.42 1.94 1.06 1.23 1.80 2.03 0.50 1.57 
CAN 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.00 1.30 1.68 0.69 1.37 0.25 1.30 0.79 1.89 0.48 1.31 1.68 2.24 0.19 1.05 
DEN 1.66 1.25 1.08 1.30 0.00 0.41 1.16 0.10 1.11 2.57 1.50 0.96 1.30 0.28 0.92 0.97 1.30 2.34 
FIN 2.06 1.53 1.36 1.68 0.41 0.00 1.43 0.38 1.47 2.92 1.76 1.05 1.71 0.60 1.12 0.72 1.66 2.73 
FRA 1.28 0.12 0.89 0.69 1.16 1.43 0.00 1.26 0.48 1.56 0.34 2.03 1.11 1.32 1.88 2.11 0.52 1.56 
GER 1.71 1.34 1.17 1.37 0.10 0.38 1.26 0.00 1.19 2.65 1.60 0.87 1.35 0.23 0.86 0.88 1.38 2.41 
ICE 0.82 0.44 0.43 0.25 1.11 1.47 0.48 1.19 0.00 1.45 0.66 1.80 0.63 1.17 1.62 2.07 0.19 1.27 
IRE 1.33 1.45 1.61 1.30 2.57 2.92 1.56 2.65 1.45 0.00 1.31 3.18 1.58 2.61 2.95 3.52 1.26 0.59 
ITA 1.34 0.27 0.42 0.79 1.50 1.76 0.34 1.60 0.66 1.31 0.00 2.35 1.26 1.65 2.20 2.45 0.59 1.42 
NLD 1.99 2.08 1.94 1.89 0.96 1.05 2.03 0.87 1.80 3.18 2.35 0.00 1.64 0.72 0.27 0.80 1.98 2.81 
NZL 0.36 1.07 1.06 0.48 1.30 1.71 1.11 1.35 0.63 1.58 1.26 1.64 0.00 1.21 1.40 2.14 0.67 1.17 
NOR 1.57 1.39 1.23 1.31 0.28 0.60 1.32 0.23 1.17 2.61 1.65 0.72 1.21 0.00 0.65 0.94 1.35 2.32 
SWE 1.73 1.93 1.80 1.68 0.92 1.12 1.88 0.86 1.62 2.95 2.20 0.27 1.40 0.65 0.00 1.03 1.78 2.56 
SWI 2.51 2.20 2.03 2.24 0.97 0.72 2.11 0.88 2.07 3.52 2.45 0.80 2.14 0.94 1.03 0.00 2.26 3.26 
UK 0.77 0.44 0.50 0.19 1.30 1.66 0.52 1.38 0.19 1.26 0.59 1.98 0.67 1.35 1.78 2.26 0.00 1.08 
USA 0.84 1.45 1.57 1.05 2.34 2.73 1.56 2.41 1.27 0.59 1.42 2.81 1.17 2.32 2.56 3.26 1.08 0.00 
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Table A.8  Table A.7 Correlation between distance measures  
 Physical  
distance (km) 
Linguistic  
distance 
Religious  
distance 
Cultural  
distance  
(Hofstede) 
Cultural  
distance 
 (Inglehart) 
Physical distance (km) 1.0000     
Linguistic distance -0.1458 1.0000    
Religious distance 0.1479 -0.0228 1.0000   
Cultural distance (Hofstede) -0.0990 0.1096 0.2042 1.0000  
Cultural distance (Inglehart) 0.0438 0.0533 0.1802 0.0214 1.0000 
 
 
